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Abstract
The quintessential derivative suit is a suit by a shareholder to force the corporation to sue a
manager for fraud, which is admittedly an awkward and likely unpleasant endeavor and, accord-
ing to the Supreme Court, a “remedy born of stockholder helplessness.” Where ownership and
control of an enterprise are vested in the same population, the need for a corrective mechanism
like a derivative suit is greatly lessened because the owner/managers’ self-interests will arguably
guide managerial conduct. But where ownership and control are in separate hands, the incentives
change, and managerial conduct may not conform to the owners’ views of the best course of ac-
tion. This may lead to what the owners consider to be director misconduct. The existing corporate
laws have not been effective in stopping this kind of director misconduct, so “stockholders, in
face of gravest abuses, were singularly impotent in obtaining redress of abuses of trust.” In these
situations, shareholders are arguably in need of legal strategies to protect themselves from abuses
by management.
Presumably in an effort to limit the abuse of strike suits that would take up managerial time,
resources, and corporate dollars, several significant procedural hurdles for derivative plaintiffs
have arisen, including the requirement of contemporaneous share ownership—a requirement that
derivative plaintiffs make a “demand” on the corporation, in particular, to take requested action—
the lack of access to the discovery process, and compliance with any relevant security for expense
statutes. Balancing the right of shareholders to hold their directors accountable against the need
for directors to have the freedom and autonomy to discharge their statutory and fiduciary duties is
no easy feat. That said, these hurdles, when combined, may erode or even undermine the ultimate
utility of the derivative litigation process.
KEYWORDS: Derivative Suit, Security for Expense Statutes, Derivative Litigation, Director
Misconduct
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ABSTRACT 
The quintessential derivative suit is a suit by a shareholder to force the 
corporation to sue a manager for fraud, which is admittedly an 
awkward and likely unpleasant endeavor and, according to the 
Supreme Court, a “remedy born of stockholder helplessness.”1 Where 
ownership and control of an enterprise are vested in the same 
population, the need for a corrective mechanism like a derivative suit 
is greatly lessened because the owner/managers’ self-interests will 
arguably guide managerial conduct. But where ownership and control 
are in separate hands, the incentives change, and managerial conduct 
may not conform to the owners’ views of the best course of action. 
This may lead to what the owners consider to be director misconduct. 
The existing corporate laws have not been effective in stopping this 
kind of director misconduct, so “stockholders, in face of gravest 
abuses, were singularly impotent in obtaining redress of abuses of 
trust.”2 In these situations, shareholders are arguably in need of legal 
strategies to protect themselves from abuses by management. 
Presumably in an effort to limit the abuse of strike suits that would 
take up managerial time, resources, and corporate dollars, several 
significant procedural hurdles for derivative plaintiffs have arisen, 
including the requirement of contemporaneous share ownership—a 
requirement that derivative plaintiffs make a “demand” on the 
corporation, in particular, to take requested action—the lack of access 
to the discovery process, and compliance with any relevant security 
for expense statutes. Balancing the right of shareholders to hold their 
directors accountable against the need for directors to have the 
freedom and autonomy to discharge their statutory and fiduciary 
duties is no easy feat. That said, these hurdles, when combined, may 
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 1. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949). 
 2. Id. 
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erode or even undermine the ultimate utility of the derivative litigation 
process. 
This Article provides an evaluation and analysis of one of the primary 
procedural roadblocks facing derivative plaintiffs as they seek to hold 
their corporations accountable: the security for expense statute. The 
Article compares existing security for expense statutes in nine states, 
while offering observations on those challenges present in the current 
statutes, as well as new challenges flowing from the statutes. The 
Article also evaluates the limited amount of case law flowing from the 
statutes, as part of an evaluation of the usefulness of this mechanism 
as a gatekeeper in derivative litigation. Finally, the Article provides 
recommendations for legislative reform and modifications to existing 
doctrine to help further the goals of shareholder empowerment 
through the derivative litigation process, while keeping the potential 
for strike suits in check. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The quintessential derivative suit is one filed by a shareholder to 
force the corporation to sue a manager for fraud, which is admittedly an 
awkward and likely unpleasant endeavor and, according to the Supreme 
Court, a “remedy born of stockholder helplessness.”3 The Court noted that 
in the absence of derivative litigation, directors were “not subject to an 
effective accountability,” thereby arguably creating incentives for 
directors to misbehave.4 The derivative suit, thus, was “long the chief 
regulator of corporate management.”5 
Stockholders who hold no concurrent management role are indeed 
limited in their arsenal to combat perceived managerial neglect or 
malfeasance. Other than exercising their voting rights to bring about a 
change in management, these shareholders are at the whim of their elected 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Id. at 548; see also John Matheson, Restoring the Promise of the Shareholder 
Derivative Suit, 50 GA. L. REV. 327, 334 (2016): 
The crux of the derivative suit is that a shareholder seeks to have the corporation enforce 
supposed rights or claims that the corporation has not yet asserted . . . the historical 
focus of the derivative suit has been an attempt by shareholders to hold the corporate 
board or officers accountable for perceived harm to the corporation caused by a 
violation of their fiduciary duties. 
 4. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 547. 
 5. Id. at 548. 
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and appointment champions, subject to the not insignificant fiduciary 
duties imposed on these managers.6 
Where ownership and control of an enterprise are vested in the same 
population, the need for a corrective mechanism like a derivative suit is 
greatly lessened because the owner/managers’ self-interests will arguably 
guide managerial conduct. But where ownership and control are in 
separate hands, the incentives change and managerial conduct may not 
conform to the owners’ views of the best course of action. This may lead 
to what the owners consider to be director misconduct. The existing 
corporate laws have not been effective in stopping this kind of director 
misconduct, so “stockholders, in face of gravest abuses, were singularly 
impotent in obtaining redress of abuses of trust.”7 In these situations, 
shareholders are arguably in “need of legal [strategies] to protect 
them[selves] from abuses by [] management.”8 
While derivative suits have been characterized as “the chief regulator 
of corporate management”9 and “the most important procedure the law 
has yet developed to police the internal affairs of corporations,”10 this 
form of litigation has its share of critics and has generated some degree 
of controversy since its debut in the 1855 Supreme Court case Dodge v. 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See Bryant G. Garth, Ilene H. Nagel & Sheldon J. Plager, Empirical Research 
and the Shareholder Derivative Suit: Toward a Better-Informed Debate, 48 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 137 (Summer 1985). 
When control and investment are separated, as is so often the case in the modern 
business corporation, the accountability of management to the shareholders becomes a 
central concern. This concern is triggered by, but not limited to, the shareholders’ 
narrow pecuniary interest: it implicates notions of mutuality of consent, of fair dealing, 
and of moral responsibility to those over whom or over whose interests one has power. 
In this context the responsibilities of the corporate manager are often cast in terms of 
fiduciary duties—duties which historically have arisen out of relationships of trust and 
confidence. 
Id. at 138. 
 7. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 548. 
 8. Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate 
Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927, 927 (1983). 
 9. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 548. 
 10. Daniel J. Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74, 77 
(1967) (quoting Eugene V. Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends is Corporate 
Management Responsible?, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46, 48 (Edward 
Mason ed. 1959)). 
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Woolsey.11 While derivative litigation offers shareholders the right to hold 
their directors accountable, this remedy itself also provides opportunities 
for abuse by the very shareholders the process seeks to protect.12 
Presumably in an effort to limit the abuse of strike suits that would take 
up both managerial time and resources, as well as corporate dollars, 
several significant procedural hurdles for derivative plaintiffs have 
arisen,13 including the requirement of contemporaneous share ownership. 
Under this requirement, derivative plaintiffs must make a “demand” on 
the corporation, with particularity,14 to take requested action without 
access to the discovery process,15 and complying with any relevant 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331 (1855). Commentators agree that Dodge v. 
Woolsey was the first shareholder derivative lawsuit. See Larry Hamermesh, A Most 
Adequate Response to Excessive Shareholder Litigation, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 147, 152 
(2016) (citing RALPH C. FERRARA ET AL., SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUITS: BESIEGING 
THE BOARD § 1.03 (2d ed. 2015) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s decision in Dodge v. Woolsey, 
firmly established the equitable jurisdiction of American courts to entertain shareholders’ 
derivative actions.”)); see also John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival 
of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. 
L. REV. 261, 261 n.2 (1981); Garth, et al., supra note 6. 
 12. According to the Supreme Court: 
Suits sometimes were brought not to redress real wrongs, but to realize upon their 
nuisance value. They were bought off by secret settlements in which any wrongs to the 
general body of share owners were compounded by the suing stockholder, who was 
mollified by payments from corporate assets. These litigations were aptly characterized 
in professional slang as ‘strike suits.’ And it was said that these suits were more 
commonly brought by small and irresponsible than by large stockholders, because the 
former put less to risk and a small interest was more often within the capacity and 
readiness of management to compromise than a large one. 
Cohen, 337 U.S. at 548. 
 13. Garth et al., supra note 6, at 139. 
 14. Franklin S. Wood, the author of a comprehensive study of derivative suits that 
has come to be known as “The Wood Report” addresses this challenge: “[d]ealing now 
with the sufficiency of particular allegations, the mere allegation of demand and refusal 
to sue is insufficient, since it does not adequately establish the exhaustion of the plaintiff’s 
remedies before resort to equity.” FRANKLIN S. WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING 
STOCKHOLDERS’ DERIVATIVE SUITS 59 (1944) [hereinafter The Wood Report]. 
 15. “The difficulty of drawing a complaint on facts of which the plaintiffs have no 
first hand knowledge or sources of information was originally felt to warrant considerable 
lenience in judging the sufficiency of a complaint . . . This view is now believed to have 
been overruled.” Id. at 58. The current approach in most statutes requiring derivative 
plaintiffs to make a formal demand is to require specificity of facts. “The courts have 
come to recognize this [unfounded claims], to appraise such general and adverbial 
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security for expense statutes. Balancing the right of shareholders to hold 
their directors accountable against the need for directors to have the 
freedom and autonomy to discharge their statutory and fiduciary duties is 
no easy feat.16 That said, these hurdles, when combined, may erode or 
even undermine the ultimate utility of the derivative litigation process.17 
Some critics find that the idea that the shareholders could weigh in 
on managerial conduct outside of their franchise rights threatens the 
unquestioned control of the enterprise by its corporate managers.18 And 
most agree that the attorneys bringing these suits are the real parties in 
interest in most cases.19 So how can we balance the desire to help and 
                                                                                                                 
allegations at their true value, and to apply increasing strictures upon general allegations 
with no specific facts in support of them.” Id. at 59. 
 16. See Matheson, supra note 3, at 330. 
 17. According to Professor Scott: 
The result of all this seems to be an absurd state of affairs. Ringing statements on the 
sacredness of the management’s fiduciary responsibilities are accompanied by a series 
of impediments to their enforcement. Each obstacle has its own peculiar history and 
rationale, but their unifying theme purports to be fear of the ‘strike suit’—an 
unwarranted action brought by an attorney in order to be bought off for a sum that is 
less than the costs of defense. 
Scott, supra note 8, at 942. According to Professor Matheson, “the current state of 
derivative litigation is encumbered by a series of primarily procedural impediments that 
make pursuit of the derivative claim unduly litigious and its successful prosecution 
practically impossible.” Matheson, supra note 3, at 331. 
 18. According to Garth et al.: 
The emergence of the derivative suit as a major threat to unquestioned control of the 
business enterprise by corporate management has not gone unchallenged. The 
challenges have not been motivated simply by venal self-interest of managerial power-
wielders. Managers understandably may question procedures that, in the risk-laden 
atmosphere of high finance and corporate business venture, could hold them to an ex 
post facto measure of the reasonableness of their judgments. 
Garth et al., supra note 6, at 139. 
 19. According to Professor Scott: 
The obvious difficulty with using derivative suits as a means of ex post settling up is 
the question of who will bring and pay for the suit. The corporation (which is to say its 
management) will not, at least not in good faith; people are not strongly motivated to 
sue themselves, and the loyalty actions we are concerned with necessarily implicate 
members of the control group as defendants. The individual small shareholder in the 
public corporation will not; he would bear 100% of the risk and expense in return for 
an infinitesimal share of the benefit that will redound to all of the shareholders. This 
free rider problem, which otherwise would defeat enforcement of fiduciary duties, has 
been surmounted in practice by giving the plaintiff’s attorney the right to obtain 
attorney’s fees if successful. Thus, in the typical case, the attorney becomes the real 
party in interest, and the suing stockholder becomes a nominal or figurehead plaintiff. 
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empower shareholders to hold their corporations accountable with the 
need for managerial freedom and discretion to discharge their fiduciary 
duties without spurious and time-wasting litigation? 
This Article provides an evaluation and analysis of one of the 
primary procedural roadblocks facing derivative plaintiffs as they seek to 
hold their corporation accountable: the security for expense statute. An 
immutable truth about litigation is that it is costly—for all parties. The 
cost of potential litigation can be an insurmountable roadblock to seeking 
one’s day in court, particularly if the relevant state law requires the 
plaintiff to post security. 
The theory behind these security for expense statutes is that they will 
act as a sieve and somehow weed out strike suits that have no merit. A 
major problem is that these suits have no true metric to determine which 
suits are in fact meritorious.20 They all use a percentage of stock or market 
value of stock owned, arguably as some sort of proxy for thoughtful and 
meritorious litigation. The theory implicitly assumes that stockholders 
with less than the required threshold will not bring meritorious claims; the 
sole metric to determine if a shareholder is acting in good faith and, thus, 
should be permitted a day in court, is the amount of stock owned.21 The 
idea presumes that a major shareholder has a financial interest in not 
wasting corporate time and resources on a frivolous claim and may be 
deterred from posting the required bond.22 It does not follow, however, 
that minority shareholders necessarily lack the same financial 
incentives.23 The amount of stock, or even the market value of one’s stock, 
                                                                                                                 
Scott, supra note 8, at 940. 
 20. Justice Hanson, writing for the District Court of Appeal for the Second District 
of California about the then-current California security for expense statute noted: 
The test laid down by the statutes as to one who has participated in some act complained 
of does not turn on whether the suit is or is not a “strike” suit but whether there is a 
reasonable probability that its prosecution against the moving party will or will not 
prove of ultimate benefit to the corporation or its security holders. The statute does not 
distinguish between so-called strike suits and those that are generally classed as being 
bona fide. The distinction between such suits is however well known and, indeed, 
recognized by statutes of like tenor in other states. Accordingly, we must assume the 
legislature was fully cognizant of those statutes and intended by the statute it enacted 
not to differentiate between the two types of suits. 
Wood v. Gordon, 246 P.2d 84, 86 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952). 
 21. Hamermesh, supra note 11, at 156–57. 
 22. Id. 
 23. According to Professor Hamermesh: 
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is not a perfect proxy for a metric to measure whether a particular 
shareholder will be wasting corporate time and money. Yet, shareholders 
whose holdings are below the relevant statutory threshold are required to 
provide security in order for their claims to move forward. 
Part I provides necessary background on derivative suits generally. 
Part II examines and compares the nine existing security for expense 
statutes, offering observations on those challenges present in the current 
statutes and those new challenges flowing from these statutes. This Part 
also evaluates the limited amount of case law flowing from these statutes, 
as part of an evaluation of the usefulness of this mechanism as a 
gatekeeper in derivative litigation. Part III provides recommendations for 
legislative reform and modifications to existing doctrine that will help 
further the goals of shareholder empowerment through the derivative 
litigation process, while keeping the potential for strike suits in check. 
I. DERIVATIVE LAWSUITS GENERALLY 
One of the first examinations of the derivative suit came in the form 
of a comprehensive study by the Chamber of Commerce of the State of 
New York in the mid-1940s, known as the “Wood Report.”24 In his letter 
introducing the report to the Special Committee on Corporate Litigation 
                                                                                                                 
[T]here is nothing in the statute that assures that a holder or a group of holders with 
sufficient shares to avoid the bond requirement will have resources or motivations 
adequate to ensure an informed, deliberate, and disinterested assessment of the merits 
of the litigation. If only because of collective action problems, it seems eminently 
possible that disaggregated stockholders will underinvest in efforts to evaluate and then 
support meritorious litigation; and, it seems equally possible that stockholders with 
enough shares to avoid the bond requirement but, without the inclination to invest in 
evaluating derivative claims, could choose to support litigation that lacks merit. In sum, 
what the New York security for expense statute lacks is any assurance that the persons 
(other than plaintiff’s counsel) whose decisions determine whether a bond is required 
will expend any resources to evaluate the quality of the derivative claims to be pursued. 
Hamermesh, supra note 11, at 156. 
 24. The Wood Report covered all derivative suits filed in the Supreme Court of New 
York and in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York between 1932 
and 1942, and those derivative suits filed in the Supreme Court of Kings County between 
1938 and 1942. Wood noted that “about sixty percent of the more substantial cases [were] 
found to be conducted by a limited group of attorneys and law firms,” and that the 
representative plaintiffs had very small stakes in the outcome. He then concluded that the 
lawyers bringing these suits made “the ambulance-chaser by comparison a paragon of 
propriety.” The Wood Report, supra note 14, at 47. 
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of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, author Robert 
Wood set out the scope of the report and shed light on the issues leading 
up to his engagement to prepare the report: 
I have undertaken and been engaged since shortly prior to September 
1, 1942, in an investigation and survey of litigation by minority 
stockholders of corporations with a view to providing an adequate 
basis of fact research to determine the advisability of possible changes 
in law or procedure which would facilitate the correction of wrong-
doing in corporate affairs but reduce groundless and costly litigation 
of this type.25 
Wood noted the “outstanding fact derived” from his survey to be an 
observation that most stockholder derivative suits in his study were 
unsuccessful and unfounded.26 Wood concluded that the financial results 
of these suits were not favorable to the plaintiffs, and that the real party 
in interest were the lawyers bringing the suits.27 According to Garth et al., 
“[Wood’s] conclusions thus led to a call for reform, culminating in 
widespread adoption of the requirement of security for expense in 
derivative suits.”28 
One of the primary recommendations from the Wood Report was 
that New York lawmakers enact a security for expense statute, with the 
goal of effecting “a proper differentiation between actions involving 
privately held and publicly held corporations and insure some 
responsibility in the bringing of such actions in the latter instances where 
                                                                                                                 
 25. The Wood Report, supra note 14, at 1. 
 26. As per Wood: 
Because of the large recoveries had in a few instances involving nationally known 
corporations, the enormous fees awarded plaintiffs’ attorneys in those cases and the 
resulting newspaper publicity, there has been a definite tendency on the part of the 
public and the bar to assume a ratio of success in these actions not in accord with the 
record. In direct consequence of this general misconception, the common attitude on 
the part of laymen and lawyers has been, while admitting the abuses in this field of 
litigation, to condone them as necessary evils or as outweighed by the assumed 
beneficial effects of such litigation. The record of these cases should demonstrate the 
fallacy of this last assumption, and without that all excuses for further indulgence of 
the abuses fails. 
The Wood Report, supra note 14, at 112. 
 27. Wood did not have kind words for the shareholder derivative bar, referring to the 
“shoddy burlesque of a professional relationship to clients [that] makes the ambulance-
chaser by comparison a paragon of propriety.” The Wood Report, supra note 14, at 47. 
 28. Garth et al., supra note 6, at 142-43. 
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the plaintiffs’ stockholdings are too small to indicate legitimate personal 
interest in the outcome and accordingly in the bringing of the action.”29 
Commentators have made note of both the Wood Report’s influence, 
its “clear anti-shareholder bias,”30 and “its confidence in the security for 
expense device as the exclusive safeguard against abusive practices in 
shareholder derivative litigation.”31 
Wood referenced and rejected several proposals that he did not feel 
would advance his goal.32 The first such proposal was to create a 
committee of a lawyer, a director, and an accountant who would be 
available to advise plaintiff stockholders in a non-binding fashion.33 
Wood correctly concluded that the non-binding nature of such 
committee’s recommendations “render it impotent against the strike 
suit”34 and stockholders’ attorneys are “not likely to be given pause by the 
recommendations of the committee.”35 
The second proposal that Wood rejected is the idea of some sort of 
preliminary court hearing to determine whether the derivative suit should 
be permitted to proceed.36 He again concludes, correctly, that such an 
approach would “either be inadequate from the plaintiff’s standpoint, or 
double burdensome from the defendants’.”37 
Wood also considered a proposal that actions by stockholders with 
less than five percent of stock outstanding should be put to a shareholder 
vote at stockholder meetings.38 His reasons for rejecting this proposal 
stemmed from his concern that this might allow majority stockholders to 
ratify their own wrongdoing.39 Wood concluded that: 
                                                                                                                 
 29. The Wood Report, supra note 14, at 21. 
 30. PAUL J. GALANTI, SECURITY FOR EXPENSE STATUTES, 19 IND. PRAC., BUS. ORGS. 
§ 38.25 (2017). 
 31. Id. 
 32. The Wood Report, supra note 14, at 22-23. 
 33. Id. at 22. 
 34. Id. at 23. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. “It would not be res adjudicata in another forum; it would inevitably involve a 
costly reference, and since it would not be final, there would always be a disinclination 
to deny trial on facts short of defenses which would warrant dismissal on motion.” Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 24. 
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[i]deally and theoretically the real determination as to whether suit on 
a particular corporate claim should or should not be brought should 
rest with the stockholders. If the transaction were one which it was 
beyond the power of a majority of stockholders to ratify, and if a 
substantial percentage of the stockholders agreed that suit should be 
brought, few would deny that it would be maintained without any 
security for costs or imposition of costs in the event of failure. On the 
other hand, no practicable way appears at present to insure such appeal 
and determination by the stockholders. In the meantime analogy to the 
safeguards already provided with respect to actions by bondholders 
for accountings, actions by creditors in a corporation reorganization 
proceedings and other similar situations where the fiction of the right 
of one to represent all may give rise to an undue temptation to indulge 
in litigation for the private profit of the fees involved, seems to 
indicate an extension of the same principle to stockholders’ derivative 
actions as the logical, fairest, most workable and at the same time 
broadest solution for the entire problem.40 
His ultimate conclusion and recommendation for a security for 
expense statute honored his goal and allowed the shareholders to 
determine whether to move forward in any given case, “safeguarded by 
the requirement that the plaintiff have a legitimate interest in the subject-
matter and assume reasonable responsibility in the way of costs in the 
event of failure.”41 Wood’s idea was that a “legitimate interest in the 
subject matter” could be satisfied by some threshold of stock ownership.42 
This idea is the cornerstone of all of the current security for expense 
statutes which began to be adopted following the Wood Report in an 
effort to discourage non-meritorious strike suits, starting with New York 
in 1944.43 
II. SECURITY FOR EXPENSE STATUTES 
A. GOALS AND CHALLENGES OF THESE STATUTES 
Following the Wood Report, the New York business community 
succeeded in pressing for a security for expense statute that created 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Id. at 117. 
 41. Id. at 116–17. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Garth et al., supra note 6; see also Donna I. Dennis, Contrivance and Collusion: 
The Corporate Origins of Shareholder Derivative Litigation in the United States, 67 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1479, 1519 (2015). 
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liability for the corporation’s reasonable expenses if the derivative suit 
failed. The statute requires a posting of security for reasonable expenses 
by shareholders filing a derivative suit who own less than a set percentage 
or dollar amount of shares. 
Since the enactment of the New York security for expense statute, a 
number of states have enacted similar statutes for various periods of 
time.44 Nine states currently have enacted security for expense statutes.45 
In these states, defendants in derivative suits are authorized to seek a court 
order to require derivative plaintiffs to post a bond to secure such 
expenses before the suit goes forward.46 
Most of the security for expense statutes are structured the same way: 
the defendant, which always includes the subject corporation but may also 
include other defendants (presumably directors and officers) may move 
to compel the plaintiff to post a bond to cover the defendants’ reasonable 
expenses if the plaintiff’s shares do not meet any relevant statutory 
minimum in terms of the percentage of ownership and/or market value.47 
The required minimum share ownership ranges from $25,000 in 
Arkansas, Colorado, and North Dakota to $250,000 in New Jersey.48 
California is the only state with a ceiling, limiting the bond to no more 
than $50,000, regardless of the number of defendants.49 
The goal of these statutes was to deter baseless derivative suits, or 
nuisance suits.50 Reasonable minds can differ on whether this has proven 
true.51 Evaluating whether this goal has been satisfied is challenging. The 
case law exploring these statutes is quite limited. Perhaps this makes 
sense in that these statutes may have become a practical reality for 
potential plaintiffs who do not want to confront additional economic risk 
in litigation. These statutes put risks on plaintiffs not typically imposed in 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Tennessee, Texas, 
Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming all had previously enacted security for expense 
statutes but have since eliminated the provisions. DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER 
DERIV. ACTIONS L. & PRAC. §§ 3.1, 3.2 (2017-2018). 
 45. See infra Part II.c. 
 46. DEMOTT, supra note 44, § 3.2. 
 47. See infra Part II.c. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. DEMOTT, supra note 44, § 3.1. 
 51. “The present trend appears to be away from reposing great confidence in the 
ability of security requirements to deter strike suits.” Id. 
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the United States where the general rule is that each side bears its own 
litigation fees.52 
Most security for expense statutes go beyond only requiring the bond 
and create potential liability for the full amount of a successful 
corporation’s costs and expenses, including, in most cases, attorney’s 
fees.53 
The timing of these statutes can also create issues for plaintiffs. 
Requiring plaintiffs to post the bond far in advance of the outcome of the 
litigation may be difficult for even the most well-intentioned and 
honorable derivative plaintiff who is light on funds. These statutes may 
impose a greater economic risk on the plaintiff rather than simply 
requiring plaintiffs to pay the successful defendants’ expenses after the 
final resolution of the case.54 
B. MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT 
The Model Business Corporation Act of 1971 (MBCA) contained a 
security for expense provision that applied only to derivative suits and 
required any plaintiff owning less than five percent of the outstanding 
shares of any class or stock with a market value in excess of $25,000 to 
“give security for the reasonable expenses.”55 This five percent threshold 
is followed in seven of the current statutes.56 Over forty years later, the 
$25,000 market value metric has continued in three of today’s security for 
expense statutes, putting into question the value of this dollar figure as a 
                                                                                                                 
 52. According to Professor DeMott: 
The significance of security for expense statutes is that, in the cases to which they apply, 
the plaintiff confronts a substantial economic risk should the defendants prevail in the 
action. This risk is one that is not typically imposed on the plaintiff in the United States; 
the “American” rule generally is that, with a few exceptions, both parties bear their own 
litigation expenses, including, most importantly, attorney fees, and that the court does 
not shift the prevailing party’s attorney fees to the nonprevailing party at the termination 
of the litigation. 
Id. 
 53. GALANTI, supra note 30, § 38.25. 
 54. DEMOTT, supra note 44, § 3.1. 
 55. Id. 
 56. These states are Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, New Jersey, New York, North 
Dakota, and Pennsylvania. See infra Part II.c. 
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true proxy for anything about the relevant shareholders in those three 
states.57 
The 1971 provision did not explicitly provide for defendants other 
than the corporation to move for plaintiffs to provide security; some of 
the security for expense statutes do provide this, with language referring 
to the corporation “or other defendant,” thereby empowering directors or 
officers sued in a derivative suit to either move to demand security 
themselves, or at least to empower the corporation to include the expenses 
of these directors or officers in its motion for security.58 
The 1971 provision provides that the amount of security can be 
changed over time at the discretion of the court.59 It gives the corporation 
recourse to the security upon the termination of the action, whether or not 
the action was brought without reasonable cause, a concept that also 
shows up in some of the current security for expense statutes.60 
Most states have some statutory provisions dealing with shareholder 
derivative claims against for-profit corporations. Yet, only nine states 
currently have security for expense statutes.61 Eleven states have 
eliminated their security for expense statutes since 1986,62 and North 
Carolina added a statute for derivative suits against directors of public 
corporations.63 The nine current security for expense statutes have a 
number of similarities, which makes sense since they are all based in large 
part on the security for expense provision in the MBCA.64 The statutes 
                                                                                                                 
 57. These states are Arkansas, Colorado, and North Dakota. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 
4-26-714(c)(1) (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-107-402(3) (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-
19.1-86(2) (2017). 
 58. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 49 (AM. BAR ASS’N, 1971). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See infra Part II.c. 
 62. Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Tennessee, 
Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. DEMOTT, supra note 44, § 3.2. 
 63. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-48(3)(2018) (stating that if a court so orders, a 
plaintiff may be required to deposit a written undertaking with sufficient surety against 
expenses reasonably expected to be incurred by a corporation, including expenses by way 
of indemnity). 
 64. The language of the 1971 security for expense statute is as follows: 
In any action now pending or hereafter instituted or maintained in the right of any 
domestic or foreign corporation by the holder or holders of record of less than five 
[percent] of the outstanding shares of any class of such corporation or of voting trust 
certificates therefor[e], unless the shares or voting trust certificates so held have a 
market value in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars, the corporation in whose right 
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generally allow corporations, and sometimes individual defendants, to 
request that derivative plaintiffs post a bond to provide security for the 
defendant corporation’s expenses, including attorney’s fees, in the event 
the defendants are successful.65 Successful defendants “may have 
recourse to the security if they prevail in the litigation, although some 
statutes limit recourse to those cases which the court determines were 
brought without reasonable cause.”66 
The current version of the MBCA contains a chapter dealing with 
derivative proceedings, which includes requirements for standing,67 
                                                                                                                 
such action is brought shall be entitled at any time before final judgment to require the 
plaintiff or plaintiffs to give security for the reasonable expenses, including fees of 
attorneys, that may be incurred by it in connection with such action or may be incurred 
by other parties named as defendant for which it may become legally liable. Market 
value shall be determined as of the date that the plaintiff institutes the action or, in the 
case of an intervenor, as of the date that he becomes a party to the action. The amount 
of such security may from time to time be increased or decreased, in the discretion of 
the court, upon showing that the security provided has or may become inadequate or is 
excessive. The corporation shall have recourse to such security in such amount as the 
court having jurisdiction shall determine upon the termination of such action, whether 
or not the court finds the action was brought without reasonable cause. 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 49 (AM. BAR ASS’N, 1971). 
 65. See DEMOTT, supra note 44, § 3.2. 
 66. See id. § 3.1. “In several states, if the court after final judgment finds that the 
action was brought ‘without reasonable cause,’ a statute authorizes the court to require 
the plaintiff to pay the defendants’ reasonable expenses incurred in the defense of the 
action, including the defendants’ attorneys fees.” Id. These state statutes include: ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-049(B) (1975); FLA. STAT. § 607.147(4) (repealed 1990); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 14-2-123(f); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-55(e); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-
86(1)(2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-47(B); TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT. ANN. art 
5.14(J)(1)(b) (expired 2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.460 (repealed 1990); WIS. 
STAT. § 180.0746 (2) (2018). 
 67. The MBCA has standing requirements for derivative plaintiffs, including 
contemporaneous ownership. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.41 (2016). A number of 
states have adopted this provision and require contemporaneous ownership. See, e.g., 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1492a (2018); ME. STAT. tit. 13-C, § 752 (2018). Some states 
have adopted a softer version of this, allowing the court to use its discretion to permit 
suits to go forward in the absence of contemporaneous ownership. See, e.g., ALASKA 
STAT. § 10.06.435 (2017); CAL. CORP. CODE § 800 (West 1982); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 
1782 (2016). Section 7.41 also requires that derivative plaintiffs must “fairly and 
adequately represent[] the interests of the corporation in enforcing the right of the 
corporation.” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.41 (2016). A number of state statutes require 
this as well. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1492a (2018); ME. STAT. tit. 13-C, § 752 
(2018). 
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making a demand,68 judicial stays of derivative proceedings,69 dismissal 
of derivative suits,70 and discontinuance or settlement of derivative suits.71 
The MBCA drops the security for expense provision and instead 
authorizes the court to order payment of expenses in three different 
scenarios.72 First, the court may order the corporation to pay the 
successful derivative plaintiff’s expenses if it determines that the 
proceedings resulted in a “substantial benefit to the corporation.”73 The 
MBCA does not specifically include attorney’s fees as a repayable 
expense, but neither does it specifically exclude attorney’s fees.74 The 
purpose of this first scenario is to “discourage a plaintiff from proposing 
inconsequential matters to justify the payment of counsel fees.”75 
The second scenario is a successful defendant, in which case the 
court may order the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s expenses in defending 
the proceeding, if it determines that the proceeding was either commenced 
or maintained “without reasonable cause” or for an “improper purpose.”76 
This provision is “intended to discourage proceedings brought for the sole 
purpose of obtaining early settlement payments by defendants to avoid 
                                                                                                                 
The introductory language of section 7.41 refers both to the commencement and 
maintenance of the proceeding to make it clear that the proceeding should be dismissed 
if, after commencement, the plaintiff ceases to be a shareholder or a fair and adequate 
representative. The latter would occur, for example, if the plaintiff were using the 
proceeding for personal advantage. If a plaintiff no longer has standing, courts have in 
a number of instances provided an opportunity for one or more other shareholders to 
intervene. 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.41 cmt. (2016). 
 68. The MBCA requires all shareholders to make a written demand, to “eliminate[] 
the time and expense of litigating whether demand is required.” See MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT § 7.42 (2016); id. § 7.42 cmt. 
 69. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.43 (2016). 
 70. Id. § 7.44. 
 71. Id. § 7.45. 
 72. Id. § 7.46. 
 73. Id. § 7.46(1). 
 74. See id. § 7.46 (2016). 
 75. This provision “does not specify the method for calculating attorneys’ fees given 
that there is a substantial body of case law that delineates this issue, which usually 
includes taking into account the amount or character of the benefit to the corporation.” 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.46 cmt. (2016). 
 76. Id. § 7.46(2). 
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significant defense costs, while also protecting plaintiffs whose suits have 
a reasonable foundation.”77 
The final scenario allows the court to order either party to pay the 
other’s expenses because of the filing of a pleading, motion, or other 
paper if the court determines that such pleading, motion, or paper was not 
“well grounded in fact” or warranted by existing law, or was “interposed 
for an improper purpose,” such as harassment or delay.78 This provision 
“addresses other abuses in the conduct of derivative litigation which may 
occur on the part of the defendants and their counsel as well as by the 
plaintiffs and their counsel. This provision may be unnecessary if these 
abuses are already addressed under applicable rules of civil procedure.”79 
More than forty states have general security for expense statutes that 
require unsuccessful plaintiffs to pay the defendants’ costs.80 Most 
include some or all of the current MBCA provisions. 
C. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT SECURITY FOR EXPENSE STATUTES 
Nine states currently have security for expense statutes that include 
or are exclusively applicable to derivative suits. A brief description of 
each statute follows, with a summary of relevant case law involving the 
statutes. The case law is modest in terms of number, scope, and 
significance. Early litigation found these statutory schemes 
constitutional.81 The absence of robust litigation on whether and how 
much bond to post may indicate that, in the years since the enactment of 
the first security for expense statutes, the concept has been woven into the 
fabric of the shareholder experience. 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Id. § 7.46 cmt. 
 78. Id. § 7.46(3). 
 79. Id. § 7.46 cmt. 
 80. DEMOTT, supra note 44, § 3.3. 
 81. In Cohen v. Beneficial Indust. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), the Supreme 
Court held that security for expense statues do not violate either the due process or equal 
protection clauses of the Constitution, although these statutes clearly can result in 
different treatment for different plaintiffs, depending on their shareholdings. At least one 
state case raised constitutional grounds to set aside a security for expense statute: in 
Moran v. Murtaugh Miller Meyer & Nelson, LLP, 152 P. 3d 416 (Cal. 2007), the plaintiff 
argued that the requirement to post such security was unconstitutional and discriminated 
against the plaintiffs of “modest means.” The court rejected this contention as well, as 
this would allow any security requirement statute to be held unconstitutional if a party 
cannot afford to post the security. 
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1. Alaska82 
Alaska’s security for expense statute allows both the subject 
corporation and other defendants (presumably directors and/or officers) 
to move the court to require that certain derivative plaintiffs “give 
security” for the reasonable expenses that such moving party or parties 
might incur.83 These expenses explicitly include attorney’s fees.84 These 
defendants can make this motion at any time before final judgment.85 
The Alaska statute requires contemporaneous ownership by 
derivative plaintiffs, absent court intervention based on the merits.86 The 
statute requires a plaintiff to make a formal demand, unless grounds exist 
for excusing such a demand.87 Court approval is required before a 
derivative suit can be “discontinued, abandoned, compromised, or 
settled.”88 
Derivative plaintiffs subject to the security posting provision are 
those holding less than five percent of any class of the corporation’s 
stock.89 Unlike most other security for expense statutes, the Alaska statute 
does not provide an alternate metric to avoid posting a bond for 
stockholders owning stock in excess of some stated financial value. There 
is no fixed dollar cap for the amount of the bond, which can be increased 
                                                                                                                 
 82. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.435(h) (2017). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.435(b) provides: 
A shareholder who does not meet the requirements of this section may be allowed in 
the discretion of the court to maintain the action on a preliminary showing to and 
determination by the court, by motion and after a hearing at which the court considers 
evidence, by affidavit or testimony, as it considers material, that: 
(1) there is a strong prima facie case in favor of the claim asserted on behalf of the 
corporation; 
(2) no other similar action has been or is likely to be instituted; 
(3) the plaintiff acquired the shares before there was disclosure to the public or to 
the plaintiff of the wrongdoing of which the plaintiff complains; 
(4) unless the action can be maintained the defendant may retain a gain derived 
from a defendant’s wilful [sic] breach of a fiduciary duty; and 
(5) the requested relief will not result in unjust enrichment of the corporation or a 
shareholder of the corporation. 
Id. § 10.06.435(b). 
 87. Id. § 10.06.435(c). 
 88. Id. § 10.06.435(i). 
 89. Id. § 10.06.435(h). 
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or decreased “from time to time in the discretion of the court upon a 
showing that the security has become inadequate or excessive.”90 
The Alaska statute specifically provides that the court may award 
reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, to successful plaintiffs if 
“anything is received as a result of the judgment, compromise, or 
settlement of that action.”91 
Alaska case law flowing from the security for expense statute is 
sparse. Only four Alaska cases reference the statute at all, and these courts 
never discuss the security for expense requirement, other than to note that 
it had not been satisfied and, thus, the suit in question should be 
dismissed.92 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. § 10.06.435(j). 
 92. In Jerue v. Millett, 66 P.3d 736 (Alaska 2003), shareholders brought a derivative 
action against directors after the state issued a certificate of involuntary dissolution. The 
lower court dismissed the case as moot following the reinstatement of the corporation 
and shareholders meeting, denied shareholder’s request for attorney’s fees and costs, and 
awarded attorney’s fees to the directors. The shareholders did not make a pre-suit demand 
and did not establish demand excusal as required by the statute. The Alaska Supreme 
Court, however, did not use the security for expense statute in its analysis and instead 
focused on determining who was a “prevailing party” to be awarded attorney’s fees under 
Civil Rule 82. Because the shareholders failed to satisfy the statutory standard for a 
derivative action, the defendant directors were deemed to be the prevailing parties but the 
plaintiffs did not have to make a demand under the security for expense statute since the 
derivative suit was not going forward. See also Erickson v. Wolf, No. 3AN-04-13743CI, 
2008 WL 8589631 (Alaska Sept. 26, 2008) (holding that filing a derivative lawsuit 
without posting the bond required based on plaintiffs’ shareholdings of less than five 
percent triggered dismissal of the derivative claims but allowed the non-derivative claims 
to continue). In Holmes v. Wolf, No. S–13641, 2011 WL 6046407 (Alaska Nov. 30, 
2011), the court dismissed the derivative claim when the shareholders failed to file the 
required bond; the case proceeded with only the shareholders’ claims against the three 
directors directly. The Alaska Supreme Court did not address the Alaska security for 
expense statute in its analysis. See also Ivy v. Calais Co., Inc., 2008 WL 9337985 (Alaska 
Super. May 5, 2008) (dismissing plaintiff’s derivative action for failing to meet the 
procedural requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Section 23.1 and the 
Alaska Statute Section 10.06.435). The order did not specify which procedural 
requirements were not met, but the court did allow the plaintiff an opportunity to refile. 
The second amended complaint filed by plaintiff alleged that the aggrieved shareholders 
owned 6.25 percent of the company’s shares and 18.75 percent of the company’s assets. 
These ownership levels make it unlikely that the security for expense statute was even 
part of the reasoning for dismissing the case. 
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2. Arkansas93 
Arkansas has a security for expense statute that allows both the 
subject corporation and “any defendant” (presumably directors or 
officers) to move the court to require that certain derivative plaintiffs 
“furnish security”94 for probable reasonable expenses that such moving 
party might incur.95 These expenses explicitly include attorney’s fees.96 
The statute is silent on the timing of any such motion, other than to say 
that the motion must be “upon notice and hearing.”97 
The Arkansas statute requires absolute contemporaneous ownership 
by derivative plaintiffs (with no provision for court intervention based on 
the merits found in the Alaska and California statutes).98 The statute 
permits courts, upon a finding that the action was brought “without 
reasonable cause,” to require a plaintiff to pay reasonable expenses, 
including attorney’s fees of the defendants;99 the statute also requires 
court approval before a derivative suit can be “dismissed or 
compromised.”100 The Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure carry additional 
requirements for derivative proceedings, parallel to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23.1, including a requirement that plaintiffs make a formal 
demand.101 
Derivative plaintiffs subject to the security posting provision are 
those holding less than five percent of any class of the corporation’s stock 
and $25,000 or less of the corporation’s stock.102 There is no fixed dollar 
cap for the amount of the bond, which can “from time to time be increased 
or decreased in the discretion of the court upon a showing that the security 
provided has or may become inadequate or is excessive.”103 
                                                                                                                 
 93. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-714(c) (2018). The statute is superseded in part by 
ARK. R. CIV. P. 23.1 Actions by Shareholders. 
 94. Id. § 4-26-714(c)(1). 
 95. Id. § 4-26-714(c)(3). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. § 4-26-714(c)(1). 
 98. Id. § 4-26-714(a). 
 99. Id. § 4-26-714(b). 
 100. Id. § 4-26-714(d). 
 101. ARK. R. CIV. P. 23.1. 
 102. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-714(c)(1). 
 103. Id. § 4-26-714(c)(7). 
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The motion for security must show either (a) that there is no 
“reasonable possibility” that the suit will benefit the corporation or its 
security holders, or (b) that the moving party did not participate in the 
transaction complained of “in any capacity.”104 Once filed, this motion 
stays the proceedings until ten days after the motion has been decided.105 
The statute makes it clear that failure to provide security when 
ordered is fatal for the plaintiff’s case.106 The moving parties will have 
access to the security “in such amount as the court shall determine upon 
the termination of the action.”107 
Like Alaska, Arkansas case law flowing from the security for 
expense statute is sparse. No Arkansas cases even mention the security 
for expense requirement. 
3. California108 
California’s security for expense statute allows both the subject 
corporation and any other defendant, specified in the statute as an officer 
or director (or former officer or director) to move the court to require 
certain derivative plaintiffs to “furnish a bond” for the reasonable 
expenses that such moving party might incur.109 These expenses explicitly 
include attorney’s fees.110 The defendants must bring this motion within 
thirty days after service of summons on the moving party.111 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Id. § 4-26-714(c)(2). This second ground is not available to the corporation. Id. 
§ 4-26-714(c)(2)(B). 
 105. Id. § 4-26-714(c)(9). 
 106. Subsection 8 says: 
If the court makes a determination that security shall be furnished by the plaintiff for 
the benefit of any one (1) or more defendants, the action shall be dismissed as to such 
defendant unless the security required by the court shall have been furnished within 
such reasonable time as may be fixed by the court. 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-714(c)(8). 
 107. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-714(c)(6). 
 108. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(c), (d) (West 1982). “Few statutes in California are 
asked to do the kind of heavy lifting that is required of Corporations Code Section 800. 
Fewer than 1,000 words in length, Section 800 represents the sum total of all legislation 
on the subject of shareholder derivative litigation in California.” Charles J. Greaves, The 
Unique Issues in Shareholder Derivative Litigation, L.A. LAW. 16, 16 (Dec. 2002). 
 109. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(c), (d) (West 1982). 
 110. Id. § 800(d). 
 111. However, the court may, for good cause, extend this thirty-day period for an 
additional period of up to sixty days. Id. § 800(c). The reality is that if a plaintiff’s bond 
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The California statute requires contemporaneous ownership by a 
plaintiff, absent court intervention, based on both the merits of the claim 
and the plaintiff’s allegation with particularity of its efforts to get the 
corporation to take the plaintiff’s desired course of action and written 
notice to the corporation or board of the cause of action.112 
The motion for security must show either (a) there is no “reasonable 
possibility” that the suit will benefit the corporation or its shareholders, 
or (b) that the moving party did not participate in the complained of 
transaction “in any capacity.”113 Filing this motion stays the proceedings 
until ten days after the motion has been decided.114 
The statute makes it clear that a ruling by the court on the motion for 
security “shall not be a determination of any issue in the action or of the 
merits thereof.”115 Despite this language, if the motion for security is 
granted, it likely ends the lawsuit. Why would any rational derivative 
plaintiff agree to post $50,000 after the court decided the suit indicated 
that either there is no reasonable possibility of success or that the 
defendant was not involved in the complained-of act in any capacity?116 
Unlike most other security for expense statutes, the California statute 
does not require court approval for a derivative suit to be settled. In 
addition, there is no statutory threshold amount of stock that must be held 
by plaintiffs to satisfy the California statute. Rather, the court has 
discretion to require any plaintiff to provide security.117 If the motion is 
granted, the court will establish the amount of security for reasonable 
                                                                                                                 
is sought in a shareholder derivative action, it is likely because “the corporation’s board 
of directors has, in response to the plaintiff’s demand, already determined that 
prosecution of the action is not in the best interests of the corporation.” Greaves, supra 
note 108, at 17. See Davis Family Capital Partners, Inc. v. Comte, No. G046254, 2013 
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2213 (Mar. 26, 2013). In Davis, the plaintiffs filed a derivative 
action. The trial court ordered the plaintiffs to post a bond of $50,000, and subsequently 
dismissed their complaint. The plaintiffs argued that the motion to require the bond was 
filed over seven months after the original complaint, far exceeding the thirty-day limit, 
and was thus untimely. The court rejected this argument, however, because the second 
amended complaint was filed one month before the defendants’ motion for the security 
for expense and therefore was considered to be timely. 
 112. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(b) (West 1982). 
 113. Id. § 800(c). This second ground is not available to the corporation. Id. 
 114. Id. § 800(f). 
 115. Id. § 800(d). 
 116. See Greaves, supra note 108, at 17. 
 117. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(d) (West 1982). 
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expenses, including attorney’s fees, not to exceed $50,000.118 This 
threshold is an aggregate and the court cannot require a greater bond, even 
if there are multiple defendants or causes of action.119 
California courts have noted that a goal of this statute is “to give the 
corporation security against groundless suits on the part of 
shareholders”120 and to “prevent unwarranted shareholder derivative 
lawsuits.”121 California courts have provided guidance with respect to the 
scope and meaning of this statute.122 Several of the main issues are 
discussed below. 
a. Can a California Derivative Plaintiff Be Required to Furnish $50,000 
in Security for Each of Multiple Defendants? 
The statutory aggregate of $50,000 is the total amount one derivative 
plaintiff can be required to post, regardless of the number of individual 
defendants.123 The statute uses the word “aggregate” when referencing the 
required bond: derivative plaintiffs must “furnish a bond in the aggregate 
amount of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) to secure the reasonable 
expenses of the parties.”124 However, the literal wording of the statute 
does not clearly indicate that this is the total for any and all defendants, 
collectively. Defendants have argued that, as a result, an ambiguity exists 
about whether the $50,000 is a cap per defendant or if it is a cap on the 
total amount the derivative plaintiff can be asked to furnish.125 
In Hale v. Southern California IPA Medical Group, Inc.,126 the 
derivative plaintiff sued the defendant corporation and its individual 
directors. Each defendant moved for the plaintiff to post bond pursuant to 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Id. 
 119. Hale v. S. Cal. IPA Med. Grp., Inc., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 773, 778 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2001). 
 120. Barber v. Lewis & Kaufman, Inc., 269 P.2d 929, 931 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954). 
 121. Donner Mgmt. Co. v. Schaffer, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 534, 538 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 122. “Because the statutory scheme governing shareholder derivative actions in 
California is skeletal, and because these actions are equitable in nature, the courts have 
played a prominent role in shaping the substantive law and procedure in this area.” 
Greaves, supra note 108, at 18. 
 123. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(d) (West 1982). 
 124. Id. § 800(e). 
 125. See Hale v. S. Cal. IPA Med. Grp., Inc., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 773, 774 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2001). 
 126. Id. 
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Section 800, and the trial court held that the plaintiff was required to 
furnish security for each defendant, totaling a bond of $250,000.127 
According to the defendants, the “underlying public policy manifest by 
Corporations Code Section 800 is to discourage frivolous shareholder 
derivative litigation . . . Placing an artificial ceiling of an aggregate totally 
ignores the underlying purpose of the statute and adds the word 
‘aggregate’ where the legislature pointedly deleted it.”128 When the 
plaintiff failed to post the $250,000 bond, the trial court dismissed the 
case, and the plaintiff appealed.129 The court found ambiguity in the 
statute in that subdivision (d) is silent on whether the language “not to 
exceed fifty thousand dollars” is applicable to each individual defendant 
or if it applies to the maximum amount without regard to the number of 
defendants.130 The court looked to the wording of subdivision (e) “in the 
aggregate amount of fifty thousand dollars,”131 which the court interpreted 
to mean that a bond of $50,000 fully satisfies the plaintiff’s statutory 
obligation.132 The court supported its interpretation by noting that 
“absurdity could result” if plaintiffs were required to post up to $50,000 
in security for each defendant in a derivative suit.133 Moreover, the court 
found that the legislative history of the most recent amendment to Section 
800, which removed an explicit cap in subdivision (d), was not intended 
to be a substantive change to that provision.134 A comment to the 
amendment reading “[t]he other changes in Section 800 are technical” 
further supported the court’s contention that the maximum amount of 
bond security to be posted is $50,000, even though subdivision (d) does 
not explicitly say so.135 Thus, the court overturned the dismissal for the 
plaintiff’s failure to post the $250,000 bond because it exceeded the 
statutory maximum of an aggregate of $50,000. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Id. at 774. 
 128. Ruling Guts State Bond Law, Directors Tell California High Court, 16 No. 14 
ANDREWS CORP. OFF. & DIRECTORS LIAB. LITIG. REP. 5 (April 23, 2001). 
 129. Hale, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 774. 
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b. Is the $50,000 Aggregate Maximum Security Also a Limit on Total 
Liability for Defendant Expenses Payable by Derivative Plaintiffs? 
The $50,000 figure in the statute is both the maximum bond a 
derivative shareholder can be required to post and also the maximum 
liability such shareholder will accrue, regardless of the actual expenses of 
a successful defendant or defendants. 
In West Hills Farms, Inc. v. RCO Ag Credit, Inc.,136 a derivative 
plaintiff was required to, and furnished, a $50,000 bond, but eventually 
lost the case because it could not prove demand futility. The successful 
defendant corporation wanted payment from the plaintiff of all of its 
reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees, regardless of the amount of the 
plaintiff’s bond.137 The appellate court noted the essential purpose of the 
statute as “a deterrent to unwarranted shareholder derivative lawsuits.”138 
Moreover, the court pointed out that Section 800(d) expressly limits, in 
plain language, the amount of the bond to be posted at $50,000 to cover 
litigation expenses incurred by the defendant.139 The court distinguished 
Section 800, a “bond or security statute,” from an “open-ended attorney 
fee liability statute,” noting that the former defines the particular relief 
available.140 It also explains that the statute makes no mention of 
attorney’s fees except in subdivision (d) which is limited in context to 
what the bond is intended to cover.141 The appellate court found nothing 
in the language of the statute to support the notion that it was “intended 
to create an independent basis for recovery . . . apart from recourse to the 
bond.”142 The court then analyzed the relevant case law and found it to be 
in agreement with the premise that Section 800 was a security for expense 
statute and not a liability statute, which means the only recourse available 
is the amount of the bond, if one was posted.143 The court therefore 
refused to write into the statute something that was not there and 
                                                                                                                 
 136. 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 458 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Donner Mgmt. Co. v. 
Schaffer, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 534, 540 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)). 
 137. Id. at 459. 
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confirmed the trial court’s finding that the defendant was only entitled to 
the amount of the bond posted by the plaintiffs.144 
c. What Are the Ramifications of a Derivative Plaintiff Voluntarily 
Posting Bond Under Section 800(e)? 
Once a derivative plaintiff voluntarily posts bond, defendants have 
no responsibilities under the statute. That said, the California courts 
explore whether the derivative plaintiff is the “prevailing party.”145 
Voluntarily posting bond does not absolve the derivative plaintiff from 
the other statutory responsibilities like contemporaneous ownership or 
making the required demand.146 
Section 800(e) authorizes derivative plaintiffs to voluntarily post 
bond before the court orders them to do so: 
(e) If the plaintiff shall, either before or after a motion is made 
pursuant to subdivision (c), or any order or determination pursuant to 
the motion, furnish a bond in the aggregate amount of fifty thousand 
dollars ($50,000) to secure the reasonable expenses of the parties 
entitled to make the motion, the plaintiff has complied with the 
requirements of this section and with any order for a bond therefore 
made, and any such motion then pending shall be dismissed and no 
further or additional bond shall be required.147 
Plaintiffs who choose to get ahead of a court order to post bond may 
do so for strategic reasons, such as avoiding a delay in the litigation 
because of court proceedings on the bond issue since Section 800(f) 
provides that if a defendant moves to require a bond, the prosecution of 
the action “shall be stayed until ten days after the motion has been 
disposed of.”148 
In Donner Management Company v. Schaffer, the derivative plaintiff 
voluntarily posted a $50,000 bond to avoid a discovery stay.149 After the 
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 145. See, e.g., Donner Mgmt. Co. v. Schaffer, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 534, 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 
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defendant’s special litigation committee found that going to trial would 
be detrimental to the company, the plaintiff moved for a motion to dismiss 
without prejudice, which was granted.150 One of the defendants moved for 
attorney fees to be paid from the $50,000 bond posted by the plaintiff.151 
The trial court awarded the fees because it determined that this defendant 
was a “prevailing party.”152 Since the statute does not use or define the 
term “prevailing party,” California courts have avoided using a “rigid 
definition” and left the decision up to the trial courts to determine whether 
a party has prevailed “on a practical level.”153 Because the special 
litigation committee found that the lawsuit would not be successful, the 
trial court exercised appropriate discretion to determine the defendants 
                                                                                                                 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 535. 
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judgment on the derivative cause of action, thus finding defendants were entitled to 
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party” when the plaintiff technically prevails but the suit brings no benefit to the 
corporation or its shareholders. Id. at *5-6. The court also stated that prevailing 
defendants are entitled to enforce a bond, but that prevailing plaintiffs may not always be 
able to avoid enforcement of the bond. Id. The parties’ decision to settle, according to the 
court, was one of temporal resolution and not an “adjudication of either liability or 
damages.” Id. at *7. Moreover, the fact that a judgment was entered did not establish that 
the plaintiff’s allegations had validity to qualify one party as prevailing over the other. 
Id. The court went on to point out that even if the settlement exposed any kind of liability, 
which it did not, it would only be liable to the plaintiff individually and not to the 
corporation or shareholders. Id. at *6-8. Therefore, since no liability from the cause of 
action was imposed by the settlement, the defendants’ motion to enforce the bond was 
allowed. Id. at *6-8, *11. 
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were the prevailing party and, thus, were entitled to the attorney fees out 
of the bond posted by the plaintiff.154 
The plaintiff argued that fees should not be awarded until after it has 
been determined there was no reasonable possibility the lawsuit would 
benefit the corporation, as required by Section 800(c)(1).155 The court 
found that when a plaintiff voluntarily posts security, as the plaintiff did 
here, a defendant need not make any further showing to collect beyond 
being a prevailing party.156 Here specifically, the defendant did not need 
to make the showing that there is no reasonable possibility of benefit to 
the corporation.157 
The court also acknowledged that it would be awkward to address 
the reasonableness issue at the close of litigation, because the decision 
about whether the litigation benefits the corporation is effectively made 
when the case is over or dismissed, as it was in this case.158 
In Shields v. Singleton, the derivative plaintiff voluntarily posted the 
$50,000 security bond but the trial court ruled that the plaintiff failed to 
make the required demand.159 The plaintiff appealed, arguing that 
voluntarily posting the bond somehow obviated the demand 
requirement.160 The plaintiff argued that the statute’s use of “section” as 
opposed to “subdivision” or “subsection” meant the legislature intended 
a voluntary bond to essentially remove the standing requirements in 
Section 800(b).161 The court looked to the California legislature’s 
revisions of Section 800, along with its predecessor, and determined the 
use of “section” instead of “subsection” was not intended to change the 
purpose of the statute, which was to “facilitate the prosecution of 
legitimate derivative claims.”162 
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 157. Id. at 541. 
 158. Id. at 540-41 (emphasis added). 
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d. Does a California Derivative Plaintiff Have to Pay the Defendants’ 
Costs if No Bond is Ever Posted? 
In Alcott v. M. E. V. Corporation, the derivative plaintiff 
unsuccessfully sued the defendant corporation and individual 
defendants.163 The defendants never sought security to be posted pursuant 
to Section 800, but attorney’s fees were awarded to them.164 The trial court 
awarded the requested fees and the plaintiffs appealed, arguing that 
attorney’s fees cannot be awarded under Section 800 when no security 
bond was posted by the plaintiff.165 
The appellate court agreed with the plaintiff and rejected the 
defendant’s argument that an amendment to Section 800 in 1982 
“transmuted” a security statute into a liability statute; because no security 
was posted, the plaintiffs are not responsible for the fees, at least pursuant 
to Section 800.166 
4. Colorado167 
Colorado’s security for expense statute allows the subject 
corporation to move the court to require certain derivative plaintiffs to 
“give security for the costs and reasonable expenses” that such moving 
party might incur.168 These moving parties may include “other parties 
named as defendant.”169 These expenses explicitly exclude attorney’s 
fees.170 This motion may be brought at any time before final judgment.171 
The Colorado statute requires contemporaneous ownership by a 
plaintiff (with no provision for court intervention based on the merits 
found in the Alaska and California statutes).172 The Colorado Rules of 
Civil Procedure add additional requirements for derivative proceedings, 
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paralleling Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, including the 
requirement that a plaintiff make a formal demand.173 
Derivative plaintiffs subject to the security posting provision are 
those holding less than five percent of any class of the corporation’s stock 
and $25,000 or less of the corporation’s stock.174 There is no fixed dollar 
cap for the amount of the bond, which can be “from time to time . . . 
increased or decreased, in the discretion of the court, upon showing that 
the security provided has or may become inadequate or is excessive.”175 
Unlike other security for expense statutes, the Colorado statute does not 
require court approval for a derivative suit to be settled.176 
Unlike the California statute, the Colorado statute provides that if the 
court determines that the derivative “action was commenced without 
reasonable cause,” the corporation shall have recourse to the security 
upon termination of the action.177 If the “costs and expenses exceed the 
amount of the bond or if no bond is posted,” the derivative plaintiff must 
“pay the costs and reasonable expenses directly attributable to the 
defense” of the derivative suit, excluding attorney’s fees.178 
No Colorado case law discusses the security for expense statutes. 
5. Nevada179 
Nevada’s security for expense statute allows both the subject 
corporation and any other defendant, specified in the statute as an officer, 
director, or former officer or director, to move the court to require certain 
derivative plaintiffs to “furnish security” for the reasonable expenses that 
such moving party might incur.180 These expenses explicitly include 
attorney’s fees.181 Like the California statute, the Nevada statute requires 
                                                                                                                 
 173. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3); COLO. R. CIV. P. 23.1. 
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 178. Jolyn J. Moses, Shareholders’ Derivative Action, in 1 COLO. PRACTICE, 
METHODS OF PRACTICE § 2:66 (7th ed. 2018). 
 179. NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.520 (1997). 
 180. Id. § 41.520(3)-(4). 
 181. Id. § 41.520(4)(b). 
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that this motion be brought within thirty days after service of a summons 
on the moving party.182 
The Nevada statute requires absolute contemporaneous ownership 
by a plaintiff (with no provision for court intervention based on the merits 
found in the Alaska and California statutes).183 The Nevada statute and 
the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure add additional requirements for 
derivative proceedings, paralleling Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, 
including a requirement that the plaintiff make a formal demand.184 
Similar to the California statute, the Nevada statute does not provide 
a threshold amount of stock that must be held by plaintiffs to satisfy the 
statute and avoid posting security.185 Rather, the court has discretion to 
require any plaintiff to provide security.186 If the motion is granted, the 
court will establish the amount of security for reasonable expenses, but 
without a cap as provided in the California statute.187 
As in the California statute, under the Nevada statute, the motion for 
security must show either (a) “[t]hat there is no reasonable possibility that 
the . . . [suit] will benefit the corporation or its security holders,”188 or (b) 
“[t]hat the moving party . . . did not participate in the transaction 
complained of in any capacity.”189 Filing this motion stays the 
proceedings until ten days after the motion has been decided.190 
If a court determines after a hearing that the moving party established 
a probability in support of either of the statutory grounds, the court 
decides “the nature and amount of security to be furnished by the plaintiff 
for reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees . . . ”191 The amount of 
security can be increased or decreased by the court’s discretion upon a 
showing that the security provided “has or may become inadequate or is 
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excessive.”192 The statute makes it clear that failure to provide security 
when ordered is fatal to a plaintiff’s case.193 
The corporation and the moving party may have recourse to the 
security upon termination of the action.194 The statute makes it clear that 
a ruling by the court on the motion for security “shall not be deemed a 
determination of any one or more issues in the action or of the merits 
thereof.”195 Unlike most other security for expense statutes, the Nevada 
statute does not require court approval for a derivative suit to be settled. 
Only one case has addressed the Nevada statute.196 In In re Cook, the 
derivative plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the derivative claims.197 The 
defendant objected, not necessarily to the claims being dismissed, but 
instead contended that the plaintiffs should be required to post bond 
pursuant to the Nevada statute to cover the defendant’s attorney’s fees.198 
The court declined to require a bond and acknowledged that, under the 
terms of the statute, the bond is not an automatic right and requires a court 
to make certain determinations before ordering such security to be 
posted.199 Here, the plaintiffs moved for dismissal before any such 
demand for security was made, thus, before the hearing required by the 
statute to determine if the bond should be ordered, and if so, how much.200 
The court then determined that Section 41.520(2) is applicable to 
derivative suits only, and once such a suit is dismissed, the statute no 
longer applies.201 
6. New Jersey202 
New Jersey has a security for expense statute that allows the subject 
corporation to move the court to require certain derivative plaintiffs to 
“give security for the reasonable expenses” that such moving party might 
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incur.203 These other parties may include “other parties named as 
defendant.”204 Under the statute, expenses explicitly include attorney’s 
fees.205 This motion may be brought at any time before final judgment.206 
The New Jersey statute requires absolute contemporaneous 
ownership by a plaintiff (with no provision for court intervention based 
on the merits, as found in the Alaska and California statutes).207 And 
derivative plaintiffs must “fairly and adequately represent [] the interests 
of the corporation” in the action208 and must make a formal demand.209 
Before a derivative suit can be “discontinued or settled,” court approval 
is required.210 
Derivative plaintiffs subject to the security posting provision are 
those holding less than five percent of any class of the corporation’s stock 
and $250,000 or less of the corporation’s stock.211 There is no fixed dollar 
cap for the amount of the bond.212 
Upon termination of the suit, the court can order the corporation to 
pay the plaintiffs’ expenses if it finds that the derivative proceeding 
resulted in a “substantial benefit” to the corporation.213 If the court finds 
that the suit was commenced or maintained without the exercise of 
“reasonable diligence by the plaintiff, or without reasonable cause or for 
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an improper purpose,” the court can order the plaintiff to pay the 
defendant’s expenses in defending the proceeding.214 Unlike the 
California statute, which has a ceiling dollar amount, the New Jersey 
statute allows for the full amount of such expenses to be paid.215 And 
finally, the court can order either party to pay the other’s expenses for 
filing pleadings, motions, or other papers frivolously.216 
No New Jersey cases explore the security for expense process. 
7. New York217 
New York’s security for expense statute allows the subject 
corporation to move the court to require certain derivative plaintiffs to 
“give security for the reasonable expenses” that the corporation might 
incur.218 The statute permits the corporation to request a bond on behalf 
of “the other parties [sic] defendant,” presumably officers and directors, 
to cover any fees “for which the corporation may become liable under this 
chapter, under any contract or otherwise under law . . . ”219 These expenses 
explicitly include attorney’s fees.220 This motion may be brought at any 
time before final judgment.221 
The New York statute requires contemporaneous ownership by a 
plaintiff (with no provision for court intervention based on the merits, as 
found in the Alaska and California statutes).222 Derivative plaintiffs must 
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make a formal demand.223 Court approval is required before a derivative 
suit can be “discontinued, compromised or settled.”224 
Derivative plaintiffs subject to the security posting provision are 
those holding less than five percent of any class of the corporation’s stock 
and $50,000 or less of the corporation’s stock.225 There is no fixed dollar 
cap for the amount of the bond, which can be increased or decreased from 
time to time, “in the discretion of the court having jurisdiction of such 
action upon showing that the security provided has or may become 
inadequate or excessive.”226 
Upon termination of the suit, the corporation shall have recourse to 
the security posted “in such amount as the court having jurisdiction of 
such action shall determine . . . ”227 
New York courts have noted that a goal of the five percent ownership 
threshold is to protect corporations from the “abuse of derivative actions 
instituted by stockholders having small or minuscule interests in a large 
corporation” since “stockholder[s] motivated by personal gain instead of 
the welfare of the corporation” would be deterred by the threshold from 
bringing a frivolous action.228 New York courts have provided guidance 
with respect to the scope and meaning of this statute.229 
a. When is it Too Late for Defendants to Move for Security? 
The language of the statute permits this motion to be brought “at any 
stage of the proceedings before final judgment.”230 In interpreting this 
language, courts have held that “the corporation’s entitlement to security 
for the reasonable expenses incurred in the action terminates with the 
entry of a final judgment.”231 In Shapiro v. Rockville Country Club, Inc., 
the defendants moved for plaintiff to post bond, but the action was 
dismissed before any judicial determination, since the defendant board’s 
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decisions were found to be reasonable.232 The defendants, however, made 
a motion for leave to renew the prior motion regarding the posting of bond 
by the plaintiff after the dismissals, which the plaintiff appealed.233 The 
court interpreted the language of Section 627 to clearly mean “the 
corporation’s entitlement to security for the reasonable expenses incurred 
in the action terminates with the entry of a final judgment.”234 The court 
then entered final judgment in the defendant’s favor before the 
defendant’s motion to renew the bond.235 
b. When Does the Court Calculate the Five Percent Ownership Stake: At 
“Any Stage of the Proceeding?” 
New York courts have made clear that the calculation of ownership 
for purposes of the security for expense requirement cannot be done after 
the suit is filed, and thus must be made at the time the derivative suit is 
filed.236 This makes implicit sense, and also should foreclose 
opportunistic behavior by defendant corporations issuing stock simply to 
trigger a security for expense for derivative plaintiffs. The timing 
requirement should also foreclose efforts by plaintiffs to buy more stock 
after filing the derivative suit to avoid posting a bond. 
There is no New York case law in which a court considers decrease 
in stock ownership after the filing of the derivative suit for the purpose of 
Section 627. The reverse is true as well; if plaintiff is below five percent 
when filing the complaint, subsequent stock acquisition during the 
pendency of the suit will not discharge the obligation to post security.237 
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In Roach v. Franchises International, Inc.,238 the derivative plaintiff 
owned more than five percent of the defendant corporation’s stock when 
the suit was filed. Thereafter, the corporation issued more stock, 
purportedly to raise money for operating expenses to retire a bank loan.239 
The plaintiff did not buy any of the new stock, claiming that the additional 
stock issuance was undertaken instead to win the bond motion by diluting 
the plaintiff below the five percent threshold to post bond.240 The 
defendants argued that the statutory language permitting the motion for 
security to be brought “at any stage of the proceedings before final 
judgment” somehow also applies to the minimum ownership threshold 
necessary to avoid security for expense.241 The court rejected this 
contention and interpreted that the language does nothing more than 
“permit the making of the application for security by the corporation at 
any time before judgment and is not an inflexible direction . . . ”242 
Therefore, the plaintiffs, at the time the action commenced, satisfied the 
statutory threshold and the motion for security for expense was correctly 
denied.243 
Dingle v. Xtenit, Inc.244 provides a similar scenario and result. The 
minority shareholder plaintiff brought a shareholder derivative action 
while owning five percent or more of the defendant’s stock. The 
defendant responded by increasing its outstanding common stock from 
10,000,000 shares to 500,000,000 shares, offering the new shares to 
officers and future employees of the corporation, excluding, of course, the 
plaintiff.245 The defendant then filed a motion to dismiss, on grounds that 
included plaintiff’s failure to post the required bond.246 The court rejected 
the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff needed to post a bond, because 
the actions outlined in the complaint were the very actions that caused the 
plaintiff’s ownership percentage to drop below the five percent 
threshold.247 The court felt that this alone was enough to demonstrate that 
                                                                                                                 
 238. Roach v. Franchises Int’l, Inc., 300 N.Y.S.2d 630, 631 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 631-32. 
 241. Id. at 632-33 (internal citation omitted). 
 242. Id. at 634. 
 243. Id. at 635-36. 
 244. 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 51587(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008). 
 245. Id. at *1. 
 246. Id. at *2-3. 
 247. Id. at *5. 
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the suit was not a “baseless strike suit[]” to serve the interests of a 
minority shareholder, as opposed to the interest of the company.248 The 
court cited case law that did not require the plaintiffs to post bond when 
their ownership interest was originally over the statutory threshold and 
was only diluted, during the pendency of the proceeding, as a result of an 
act by the corporation.249 Since the plaintiff owned fifteen percent at the 
time of the complaint, no bond was required to be posted.250 
c. Can Derivative Plaintiffs Aggregate Ownership to Get Over the Five 
Percent Threshold? 
The statute is silent on this issue, but courts have opined that the 
language in the statute “unless the plaintiff or plaintiffs hold five percent 
or more” allows for plaintiffs to aggregate their shares with intervenors.251 
But the aggregation must be done before the lawsuit is filed so that the 
plaintiffs “hold” the necessary stock ownership when filing the derivative 
complaint.252 
In Miller v. Victor,253 after the defendant moved for security for 
expense, the plaintiff joined another shareholder as an additional party so 
their combined interests would be above the five percent statutory 
minimum. The court found this action to be too late to prevent the security 
for expense requirement.254 
                                                                                                                 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. See, e.g., Miller v. Victor, No. 14-cv-1819 (PKC), 2015 WL 892276, at *1-2 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2015). 
 252. Id. at *2. According to Professor DeMott: 
The problems raised by aggregation stem from the interplay between the 
contemporaneous ownership requirement and the exemption provisions in security for 
expense statutes. The plaintiff, in order to satisfy the contemporaneous ownership rule, 
must have owned some shares in the company as of the time of the occurrence of the 
wrong alleged in the suit; to be exempt from the security for expense requirements, the 
original plaintiff and any intervenors must own shares in excess of the threshold amount 
or percentage set by the statute. The problem is whether the purpose of the 
contemporaneous ownership rule is frustrated if the plaintiff can be exempted from the 
security requirements by acquiring shares after the time of the wrong alleged in the suit. 
DEMOTT, supra note 44, § 3:9. 
 253. Miller, 2015 WL 892276, at *1. 
 254. Id. at *3. 
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8. North Dakota255 
North Dakota’s security for expense statute allows the subject 
corporation to move the court to require that certain derivative plaintiffs 
“give security for the reasonable expenses” that such moving party might 
incur.256 These expenses explicitly include attorney’s fees.257 This motion 
may be brought at any time before final judgment.258 
The North Dakota statute requires contemporaneous ownership by a 
plaintiff (with no provision for court intervention based on the merits, as 
found in the Alaska and California statutes).259 
Derivative plaintiffs subject to the security posting provision are 
those holding less than five percent of any class of the corporation’s stock 
and $25,000 or less of the corporation’s stock.260 There is no fixed dollar 
cap for the amount of the bond.261 
Upon termination of the suit, the court can order the plaintiff to pay 
the corporation’s expenses if it finds that the derivative proceeding was 
brought “without reasonable cause.”262 Unlike the California statute that 
has a ceiling dollar amount, the North Dakota statute allows for the full 
amount of such expenses to be paid.263 The corporation may have recourse 
to the security upon termination of the action.264 
No North Dakota cases explore the security for expense process. 
9. Pennsylvania265 
Pennsylvania’s security for expense statute allows the subject 
corporation to move the court to require that certain derivative plaintiffs 
“give security for the reasonable expenses” that the corporation might 
                                                                                                                 
 255. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-86(2) (1997). 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. § 10-19.1-86. 
 260. Id. § 10-19.1-86(2). 
 261. Id. § 10-19.1-86(2)(b). 
 262. Id. § 10-19.1-86(1). 
 263. Id.; see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(d) (West 1982). 
 264. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-86(2)(c). 
 265. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1782 (2016). 
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incur.266 These expenses explicitly include attorney’s fees.267 This motion 
may be brought at any stage of the proceeding.268 
The Pennsylvania statute requires contemporaneous ownership by a 
plaintiff or the showing of “a strong prima facie case in favor of the claim 
asserted on behalf of the corporation and that without the action serious 
injustice will result.”269 Derivative plaintiffs must make a formal demand, 
unless such a demand is excused.270 Court approval is required before a 
derivative suit can be “dismissed or compromised”271 
Derivative plaintiffs subjected to the security posting provision must 
hold less than five percent of any class of the corporation’s stock and 
$200,000 or less of the corporation’s stock.272 There is no fixed dollar cap 
for the amount of the bond, which can be increased or decreased from 
time to time, “in the discretion of the court upon showing that the security 
provided has or is likely to become inadequate or excessive.”273 
Pennsylvania is unique among the nine statutes, in that it provides a 
financial hardship exception where security may be denied or limited 
under the court’s discretion if the security requirement imposes undue 
hardship on plaintiffs and serious injustice would result.274 Further, a 
successful plaintiff may be awarded its reasonable expenses, including 
attorney’s fees and costs, capped at “a reasonable proportion of the value 
of the relief obtained by plaintiff.”275 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Broader questions exist as to the value and efficacy of derivative 
litigation as a vehicle for corporate good that are well beyond the scope 
of this Article.276 For shareholders bound by one of the nine security for 
                                                                                                                 
 266. Id. § 1782(c). 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. § 1782(b). 
 270. Id. § 1781(a)(1)-(2). 
 271. 231 PA. CODE § 1506(d) (1991). 
 272. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1782(c) (2016). 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. § 1782(b). 
 275. Id. § 1784(b). 
 276. As described in the introductory comment to the MBCA: 
A great deal of controversy has surrounded the derivative suit, and widely different 
perceptions as to the value and efficacy of this litigation continue to exist. On the one 
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expense statutes, posting a bond may not be the only option. As discussed 
above, like-minded shareholders can join together and aggregate their 
stock ownership to five percent or more of at least one class of the subject 
corporation’s stock before filing the derivative suit.277 One challenge 
posed by this idea may arise if the shareholder is not able to access the 
shareholder list to reach potential co-plaintiffs because of a lack of 
sufficient stockholding to satisfy any threshold requirement for inspection 
rights. 
Another circumvention method could include a federal cause of 
action along with the state-law based derivative claim. In federal courts, 
there is no general federal security for expense statute for derivative 
actions, although one federal securities law touches on the concept of 
direct litigation.278 Security for expense statutes may have the unintended 
effect of encouraging plaintiffs to couch their claims under these 
securities laws, which may not be the truest legal claim based on the facts. 
But for derivative plaintiffs in the nine states previously discussed 
who cannot avoid the security for expense statute and must choose 
between posting a bond that the court thinks is appropriate or failing to 
pursue the claim, the question remains whether such shareholders are 
actually better off generally. Do these nine security for expense statutes 
offer shareholders real options other than voting current management out 
                                                                                                                 
hand, the derivative suit has historically been the principal method of challenging 
allegedly illegal action by management. On the other hand, it has long been recognized 
that the derivative suit may be instituted more with a view to obtaining a settlement 
resulting in fees to the plaintiff’s attorney than to righting a wrong to the corporation 
(the so-called “strike suit”). 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, Introductory Comment, Subchapter D. 
 277. See supra Part II.c.7.c, for a discussion of aggregation. 
 278. Section 11(e) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides: 
In any suit under this or any other section of this subchapter the court may, in its 
discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such suit, including 
reasonable attorney’s fees, and if judgment shall be rendered against a party litigant, 
upon the motion of the other party litigant, such costs may be assessed in favor of such 
party litigant (whether or not such undertaking has been required) if the court believes 
the suit or the defense to have been without merit, in an amount sufficient to reimburse 
him for the reasonable expenses incurred by him, in connection with such suit, such 
costs to be taxed in the manner usually provided for taxing of costs in the court in which 
the suit was heard. 
15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (West 1998). 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act also permit a court 
to require security from either party. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(f), 78r(a). For additional 
discussion on this, see DEMOTT, supra note 44, § 3.4. 
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of office or voting with their feet and selling their ownership interests? In 
other words, are these statutes actually protecting shareholders from some 
threat that would not be handled by state law claims of violation of 
fiduciary duty? The challenge for academics and practitioners is how to 
measure the existence and degree of any such protection. It seems naïve 
and simplistic to assume that shareholders who are not required to post 
security as a result somehow become altruistic, or at least exercise 
common sense and good judgment. They may nonetheless think they have 
an axe to grind. 
The Wood Report concluded that security for expense statutes were 
the sole and exclusive way to protect the balance between allowing 
shareholders to hold their corporations accountable and allowing those 
corporations to conduct the business of shareholder maximization free 
from myriad nuisance or strike suits. But using share ownership levels or 
market value as the sole metric to measure shareholders’ intentions is a 
risky proposition.279 As with any bright line test, the metric may not get it 
right. Some valid claims by thoughtful shareholders acting in good faith 
may never be raised if they cannot satisfy the security for expense statute. 
Likewise, some meritless claims can and have been brought by 
shareholders who are not required to post security. 
The prudent course is to broaden the application of the MBCA 
provisions for ordering expenses after the matter has been adjudicated and 
encourage all states to adopt any of the three provisions that have not yet 
been enacted there. First, if the lawsuit resulted in a “substantial” benefit 
to the corporation, the plaintiff is entitled to expenses from the 
defendant.280 This should be modified to add the idea that such expenses 
must be reasonable, to avoid opportunistic behavior by the parties. 
                                                                                                                 
 279. According to Professor DeMott: 
The reasoning of the Wood Report appears naive, or at least anachronistic, in two 
respects. First, nothing in the report anticipates the widespread use of intervention to 
exempt the original plaintiff from the security requirements. Second, the report is 
striking in the confidence it reposes in the security requirements as 
the exclusive safeguard needed to guard against abusive practices in derivative 
litigation; for example, it argues that a security provision would obviate any need to 
require court approval of discontinuances and settlements of actions. Finally, the 
Report’s methodology and motivations have received trenchant criticism over the 
years, but this appears not to have undermined completely the appeal of the Report’s 
conclusions. 
DEMOTT, supra note 44, § 3.2. 
 280. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.46(1). 
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According to the MBCA comments, the substantial benefit requirement 
is necessary “to prevent the plaintiff from proposing inconsequential 
changes in order to justify the payment of counsel fees.”281 This is helpful 
but begs the question of what constitutes a “substantial” benefit. Clarity 
and uniformity in the parameters of this definition would allow similarly 
situated parties to be treated similarly. 
Next, if instead of finding a substantial benefit, the court finds that 
the derivative proceeding was “commenced or maintained without 
reasonable cause or for an improper purpose[,]” the court may order the 
plaintiff to pay the defendant’s expenses.282 Unlike the proposed 
modification to Section 7.46(1), the official comments give us some 
guidance as to what constitutes an “improper purpose” which can aid in 
the effort to promote uniform treatment for similarly situated parties: 
The test in this section is similar to but not identical with the test 
utilized in section 13.31, relating to dissenters’ rights, where the 
standard for award of expenses is that dissenters “acted arbitrarily, 
vexatiously or not in good faith” in demanding a judicial appraisal of 
their shares. The derivative action situation is sufficiently different 
from the dissenters’ rights situation to justify a different and less 
onerous test for imposing costs on the plaintiff. The test of section 
7.46 that the action was brought without reasonable cause or for an 
improper purpose is appropriate to deter strike suits, on the one hand, 
and on the other hand to protect plaintiffs whose suits have a 
reasonable foundation.283 
Finally, states that have not done so should add in the ideas in MBCA 
Sections 7.46(2) and (3), which address other abuses and opportunistic 
conduct by the parties in derivative suits that were not “commenced or 
maintained without reasonable cause or for an improper purpose.”284 This 
broad language also picks up misbehavior on the part of the parties’ 
counsel.285 
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CONCLUSION 
Whether security for expense statutes are effective at all is difficult 
to say. Since there are so few cases involving them, case law interpreting 
these statutes and describing the rights and options of derivative plaintiffs 
would be illustrative. But more salient than the broad question of whether 
these statutes are working is the embedded issue of how we can measure 
whether five percent or $200,000 is the “right” number to weed out strike 
suits but magically capture meritorious suits. There seems to be no way 
to be sure. In the absence of evidence that these statutes are helping, and 
in the further absence of any meaningful way to quantify this, perhaps the 
prudent course is to stick with a statutory scheme that allows courts to 
award costs to unsuccessful derivative plaintiffs ex post, instead of 
requiring security to be posted ex ante. 
